Executive-pay packages often don’t include a comparison of company performance and its competitors are regularly approved by boards of directors, and many have wondered why.
New research by University of Michigan professor Martin Schmalz and co-authors Miguel Anton and Mireia Gine of the IESE Business School and Florian Ederer of the Yale School of Management helps explain why—and why benchmarking happens more in some industries than in others.
They found that when companies in an industry are owned by the same shareholders, the executives tend to be rewarded relatively more for industry performance and less for their own company’s performance.
“Many people have been puzzled why shareholders approve pay packages that lead to high pay without much benchmarking,” said Schmalz, the NBD Bancorp Assistant Professor of Business Administration and an assistant professor of finance. “But it’s actually not that puzzling once you analyze these shareholders’ economic incentives.”
Schmalz, Anton, Ederer and Gine examined 20 years’ worth of data from ExecuComp, which measures the compensation of top executives of the largest 2,000 U.S. companies.
The more a company’s institutional shareholders own big stakes in rival companies, the less pay managers receive for company performance and the more pay they receive in response to rivals’ performance.
The logic is easy to understand, the author contends:
If you benchmark performance against rival companies, that gives managers an incentive to compete aggressively. If you own a number of companies in the same industry, you don’t want that to happen,” Schmalz said. “If anything, you want them to cooperate more, because you want to improve the value of your entire portfolio, not just one company. Our findings suggest managerial contracts give managers economic reasons to act in their shareholders’ interests—it’s as simple as that.